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Abstract
We investigate the problem of detecting the presence of clandes-
tine neutron sources, such as would be produced by nuclear weapons
containing plutonium, within cargo containers. Small, simple and eco-
nomical semiconductor photodiode detectors affixed to the outsides of
containers are capable of producing statistically robust detections of
unshielded sources when their output is integrated over the durations
of ocean voyages. It is possible to shield such sources with thick layers
of neutron-absorbing material, and to minimize the effects of such ab-
sorbers on ambient or artificial external neutron fluxes by surrounding
them with neutron-reflective material.
Terrorist nuclear weapons or special nuclear material may be shipped in cargo
containers, and their detection is a matter of serious concern. If the special
nuclear material is plutonium then its 240Pu content is a significant source of
spontaneous fission neutrons, depending on the quantity of plutonium and its
isotopic composition. These spontaneous fission neutrons may be detectable.
In an earlier report1 we suggested applying 10B-coated photodiode neu-
tron detectors to the outsides of shipping containers to detect any sponta-
neous fission neutrons emitted inside. Simple analytic estimates showed that,
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integrated over a ten day voyage, a 1 cm2 detector would detect with high
statistical significance an unshielded spontaneous fission neutron source in
the presence of the background of cosmic ray-induced spallation neutrons.
The purpose of this note is to report the results and implications of quanti-
tative Monte-Carlo neutron transport calculations of this problem, including
the effects of shielding and the contents of surrounding containers. These
calculations used the MCNPX code2−4, which is a standard tool used to
calculate neutron transport.
In all of these calculations the assumed source was a sphere of 5 kg of
δ-plutonium (radius 4.22 cm). A source strength of 4.5 × 105 n/s was cho-
sen (this is appropriate to 10 percent 240Pu, a compromise between nominal
“weapons grade” and “reactor grade” compositions). The results were nor-
malized to the source rate of spontaneous fission neutrons. The plutonium
was surrounded by a 50 cm thick spherical shell of nominal “explosive” (com-
position C7N3O6H5 and density 1.62 gm
−3; TNT). This is not meant to be a
realistic bomb; rather, it was deliberately chosen as an amateur interpreta-
tion of Fat Man (the subject of the Trinity test and dropped on Nagasaki).
The thick “explosive” layer is a fairly effective moderator and reflector and
a significant absorber. The assembly is close to thermal neutron criticality
(the multiplication factor is 6.0), and for each source neutron there are 20
neutron crossings of the boundary between plutonium and “explosive”, while
only 0.24 neutrons cross the outer surface of the “explosive”.
The source was at the center of a 40′ shipping container. The detector
was applied to the surface of the container (the container walls were ignored)
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at a point half-way from bottom to top but 3.29 m displaced from the center
of the side of the container along its length, so that the center of the detector
was 3.5 m from the center of the source. This location was chosen because
three detectors may be applied to the container so that no point within its
volume is more than 3.5 m from any detector. Three detectors is a reasonable
compromise between the requirements to minimize the number of detectors
and to bring every point in the container as close as possible to a detector.
In order to obtain accurate statistics with a feasible number of Monte Carlo
particles a disc detector of 1 m radius was used in the calculations, and the
inferred count rate scaled to the more practical 1 cm2 detector.
The detector itself consisted of a 2 µ layer of boron enriched to 80 percent
10B. In all cases the detector was assumed to have an area of 1 cm2. The
silicon or gallium arsenide photodiode, perhaps 10 µ thick, is not calculated
explicitly, but a (conservative) 0.25 efficiency for detection of (n,α) reactions
in the boron is assumed, as discussed by Grober and Katz1. This layer is
sandwiched between two 1.75 cm thick layers of paraffin or polyethylene (CH2
of density 0.92 g/cm3) whose purpose is to thermalize neutrons emitted by
a bare source. When the source is moderated the CH2 acts as a neutron
reflector (each slab has a scattering optical depth, at normal incidence, to
thermal neutrons of 2.8). The thickness of these layers is constrained by
the corrugations of shipping container walls, which are about 3.75 cm deep.
If the slabs of CH2 were not included the detector would be insensitive to
an unmoderated neutron source. A more sophisticated system would include
detectors with and without sandwiching slabs of CH2.
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This baseline calculation produces a reaction rate of 1.5× 10−5 cm−3 (of
the boron film) per source neutron. In 106 seconds of exposure (typical of a
transoceanic voyage) to a source of 4.5 × 105 neutrons s−1 a 1 cm2 detector
records 340 events, given the assumed efficiency. This may be compared to
the rough estimate1 of 600 detected events. The results cannot be compared
closely because the estimate assumed a bare unmoderated source for the
baseline problem.
A number of variations on the baseline calculation were performed. For
example, surrounding the container containing the neutron source with 26
innocent containers (a 3× 3× 3 array of containers, with the neutron source
in the central container), with each innocent container filled with a nomi-
nal homogeneous cargo of 0.3 g/cm3 (the known mean density of container
loading), taken to be of composition FeH (3.7% hydrogen by mass; only the
hydrogen is significant for neutronics so the composition of the remainder of
the mass is irrelevant), increases the number of (n,α) reactions detected to
1600. This is a consequence of neutron reflection by the hydrogen in the inno-
cent containers. It is about ten times less than the rough estimate1, probably
because the latter ignored the reflective effect of the CH2 slabs around the
detector.
The assumption of homogeneous cargo (other than the assumed threat
source) is of uncertain validity and may introduce significant error. Neutron
transport is very different in a heterogeneous medium, with free passages
between regions of comparatively high hydrogen density, than in a homo-
geneous medium. Some cargoes (for example, a container packed full of
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clothing) are reasonably homogeneous, while others (machinery, dense ob-
jects with hydrogenous packing, drums of chemicals) may either contain no
hydrogen or have it concentrated into isolated regions. Unfortunately, it is
probably not possible to resolve this uncertainty computationally because
the hydrogen distribution in real cargo is difficult to characterize. Straight-
forward experiments in which real neutron sources (D-D accelerators, (α,n)
or 252Californium, not plutonium!) are placed in instrumented containers
among innocent cargo are probably necessary to resolve these uncertainties.
These count rates should be compared to those produced by cosmic ray
spallation neutrons. The chief source of these neutrons is spallation in the
cargo (both the threat source and surrounding innocent cargo), rather than in
the air, because cargo densities (0.3 g/cm3, of which very little is hydrogen)
are hundreds of times greater than the density of air. The production of
neutrons by cosmic ray interactions in surrounding cargo and the ship itself
is known as the “ship effect”. Solar neutrons are negligible compared to those
made by spallation.
Again, the FeH composition was assumed; the spallation neutron produc-
tion rate is nearly independent of the composition of the non-hydrogenous
portion of the material. Therefore, MCNPX calculations were done in which
containers containing innocent cargo were irradiated by cosmic rays, and
neutron production, transport and reaction were calculated. The sea-level
cosmic ray spectrum from 100 MeV to 100 GeV was taken from Pal5, and
vertical downward incidence distributed uniformly across the top of the con-
tainer at a flux of 2.7×10−4 cm−2 s−1 was assumed (this makes it a reasonable
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approximation to ignore cosmic rays entering the container from the side).
The cosmic rays were assumed to be all protons because the more abundant
muons rarely produce neutrons.
The result for irradiation of a single container filled with the same model
(FeH at 0.3 g cm−3) of innocent cargo, integrated over 106 s, with the same
detector as before, was 0.6 detected reaction. When an array of 27 similar
containers was taken this increased to 1.7 detected reactions, as a result of
reflection of neutrons by the surrounding containers. These results are very
small compared to the predicted signals of the assumed threats discussed
above, and indicate that the natural neutron background is not a signifi-
cant obstacle to detection of spontaneous fission neutrons from the assumed
threat. These backgrounds are about two orders of magnitude less than the
rough estimates of Grober and Katz1, in part because the estimates did not
allow for thermal neutron reflection by the CH2 slabs surrounding the detec-
tor, and in part because of differing assumptions regarding the cosmic ray
flux (equivalently, geomagnetic latitude).
Unfortunately, anyone capable of building even an improvised plutonium-
based nuclear device is probably aware of the desirability of shielding the
spontaneous fission neutrons and is capable of doing so. An effective shield
is a 50 cm layer of borated polyethylene or paraffin. A series of calculations
was run with such a shield, in the form of a spherical shell of inner radius
54.22 cm and outer radius 104.22 cm containing 5% natural boron by mass.
The result was to reduce the detected counts in the baseline calculation to
0.08, an effective shielding factor of about 4000. This is clearly undetectable.
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If the source is surrounded by 26 containers filled with innocent cargo 0.7
counts are detected, the effective shielding factor is 2000, and the source
would still be undetectable.
Thermal neutron absorbers produce a “hole” in the surrounding distri-
bution of thermal neutrons. Would it be possible to detect the presence of
such an absorber (comparatively uncommon in innocent cargo) by measuring
the density of thermal neutrons produced by cosmic rays? Two calculations
were done to test this. In the first the absorber (with only a void inside)
was placed in a container, and the container outside the absorber was filled
with the usual assumed FeH innocent cargo. In the second calculation this
container was surrounded by 26 containers each filled with innocent cargo.
The results agreed, to within a few percent, with the results for con-
tainers containing innocent cargo but no neutron absorbers. The reason for
this is that once neutrons have thermalized (the detector is not sensitive
to unthermalized neutrons) their scattering mean free path in the cargo is
about 7.5 cm. The detector, about 2.5 m (33 mean free paths) from the
absorber, senses a neutron field essentially unaffected by the presence of the
absorber. Of course, someone deliberately hiding the presence of absorber
would surround it with material of even greater hydrogen density (for ex-
ample, CH2, in which the mean free path is about 0.6 cm). Hence thermal
neutron detection is not likely to be a feasible method of detecting thermal
neutron absorbers if even the most minimal measures are taken to conceal
them within a neutron-scattering medium.
Similar conclusions apply to interrogation of containers with fast neu-
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trons. Although they (like the spontaneous fission neutrons calculated here)
are much more penetrating than thermal neutrons, it is still possible, within
the volume of a cargo container, to moderate and absorb them. Even if fission
were induced in fissionable material (by a penetrating interrogation beam, or
the natural muon background), that material could be surrounded by enough
moderator and absorber to prevent detection of the fission neutrons, and by
enough neutron scatterer to prevent detection of the neutron absorber.
We conclude that boron neutron detectors can be an effective means
of detecting the presence of unshielded neutron sources, such as kilogram
quantities of plutonium, within cargo containers (uranium, of any isotopic
composition, is a negligible source of neutrons). A knowledgeable adversary
may shield such sources, and the presence of such shields may be concealed
from detection by their effects on the background thermal neutron density if
they are surrounded with neutron-reflective material.
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Table of Problems
No. Features Counts in 106 s
1 Baseline (4.22 cm Pu, 50 cm HE) 340
2 Baseline + 26 innocent containers 1600
3 Innocent container with cosmic rays 0.6
4 27 innocent containers with cosmic rays 1.7
5 Baseline with 50 cm borated CH2 shield 0.08
6 Baseline + shield + 26 innocent containers 0.7
7 No. 3 + shield 0.6
8 No. 4 + shield 1.8
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